This article studies the institutionalization and implementation of policies addressing women's low labor force participation in Turkey. It examines how state actors and institutions translate gender mainstreaming and work-family balance in the Turkish policy context. Approaching the state as a multi-layered and hierarchical set of institutions and practices, we trace the emergence of a policy architecture that marginalizes questions of women's employment and gender equality. Our goal is to shed light on how state actors and institutions actively participate in vernacularizing transnational gender policy norms and, in the process, bend these norms so far that they produce contradictory meanings and practices.
Introduction
This article studies gender policy architecture, addressing the problem of women's low labor force participation in Turkey, focusing on the emerging divisions of labor among state institutions and the ways in which gender and employment policies are institutionalized and designed. We discuss the ways in which state actors and institutions appropriate transnational norms related to gender mainstreaming and work-family balance through the following questions: How do transnational gender policy discourses, international funding, and state social policy institutions interact? What possibilities for gender politics emerge at their juncture in locally specific ways? What theoretical insights about states and social policies do these interactions prompt?
In exploring these questions, we approach the state as a multi-layered set of institutions and practices (Connell 1990; Haney 2002 ) with characteristic internal hierarchies, alliances, and conflicts that shape local adoption of transnational gender policy discourses. Our goal is to trace how states translate, interpret, and steer such discourses and programs on the ground (Levitt and Merry 2009; Zwingel 2013; Behrends, Park, and Rottenburg 2014) . Thus the paper engages with, and moves beyond, existing debates in the literature about the limitations of both gender mainstreaming and work-family balance discourses and policies.
First, we show that internal hierarchies among state institutions and their conflicting priorities result in a situation where the emerging interpretation of the transnational norm of gender mainstreaming paradoxically marginalizes policy making about women's employment. Thus, we argue that a welfare state structure, which continues to assume gendered divisions of labor and expects women to work at home and men outside, may cancel even the limited effects of gender mainstreaming. Second, we analyze the specific design of policies and programs implemented, focusing on the use of discourses of workfamily life reconciliation through them. We show how the same hierarchies and internal divisions of labor within the state enable state actors to render this transnational norm of work-family life reconciliation into the local policy vernacular. Policy making and implementation supposedly driven by gender equality thus paradoxically reinforces the institution of the family, naturalizes gendered divisions of care labor, and domesticates women. As a result of this specific vernacularization (Levitt and Merry 2009) , labor market and putatively family-friendly policies lock women in informal jobs and precarious, home-based enterprises while intensifying their double burden of earning and caring. In other words, this is a case where even the most limited understandings of gender mainstreaming and work-family balance go unrealized. In the Turkish social policy context, these norms leave ample room for state institutions to marginalize questions concerning women's labor force participation despite appearing to do the opposite. Overall, through an analysis of Turkish social policy institutionalization and implementation regarding women's labor force participation, our goal is to reveal how interactions and hierarchical divisions of labor between state institutions and actors vernacularize transnational gender policy norms and, in the process, bend these norms so far that they produce contradictory meanings and practices.
The Turkish case is a strategic one for studying contradictory processes of vernacularization because the Turkish state has long been pressured by international organizations, including the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the World Bank (WB), to adopt policies encouraging women's egalitarian labor force participation. In response, over the past decade, the Turkish state has taken steps to implement gender mainstreaming, relying heavily on EU funding. However, despite this apparent effort to institutionalize transnational gender norms and the fact that the country has the world's eighteenth largest economy, women's low labor force participation persists. According to the latest figures, only 32.5 percent of working-age women are in the labor force, a significantly lower figure than the global average of 49.5 percent (ILO 2017; TURKSTAT 2017) . In addition, scholars observe that, especially since the second electoral victory of the ruling party in 2007, official pronouncements, social policy choices, and proposed legislation (Coşar and Ye geno glu 2011; Acar and Altunok 2012 ; Cindo glu and € Unal 2017) all reflect a blend of neoliberalism, religious conservatism, and nationalism, enforcing women's return to domesticity and a restricted presence in the public sphere. Turkey's story involves a specific process of localization, and merits detailed analysis as such. Nonetheless, we consider it as one process in a more general tendency to sideline attention to real gender equality and deploy discourses of familialism and maternalism, even while locating them in "mainstreaming." We analyze, therefore, Turkey as an example of how the institutionalization and policy implementation of gender mainstreaming and work-family balance can result in their translation to contradictory definitions.
The research for this paper was conducted in 2013. In the first stage of the research, we established a comprehensive archive of national and international policy documents, legal texts, strategic plans, and reports pertaining to women's labor force participation. We compiled an inventory of all programs implemented in the last decade by a range of ministries and affiliated institutions, both public and private. This inventory mapped a multiplicity of institutions and policy practices in what we call, following Haney (2002) , the policy architecture of women's labor force participation. The concept of policy architecture signifies how state institutions interpret needs, identify policy problems, and devise distributive responses. In our particular case, this architecture defines whether and to what extent women's low labor force participation is a problem before designing and implementing appropriate policies. The concept of policy architecture reveals the multiplicity of actors and institutions participating, collaborating, or competing with one another from the definition of the policy problem to the implementation of policy.
Guided by our analysis of this documentary archive, we next made field visits to relevant state and non-state institutions in Ankara and Istanbul, conducting a total of twenty-eight interviews. 1 In this policy architecture, three ministries-the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and the Ministry of Development-occupy core positions; they are responsible for defining policy problems, determining solutions, and allocating resources. Having started with these three ministries, we then branched out to other state institutions, including the Turkish Employment Agency and the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Organization, which play visible roles in policy implementation. We conducted eighteen interviews across twelve state institutions. We conducted the remaining ten interviews with personnel in a variety of non-state institutions, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks, and business associations, which often partner with state institutions in policy design and practice. In all interviews, we used a semi-structured interview guide with questions about the institution's roles and activities regarding women's labor force participation. Before each interview, we revised the guide with information gathered from our desk study, ensuring to ask questions about interviewees' experiences as state actors situated within specific policy paradigms and institutional divisions of labor. We also asked them to share their observations of other institutions' and influential actors' positions in the policy process. As a result, we were able to trace their insider understandings of how policy processes work (Moyser 2006) and determine the relative influence of the institutions involved.
In this paper, we rely mainly on documentary archive analysis and interviews at state institutions, with a special focus on the activities of the three principal ministries and state agencies listed above. In most of these interviews, there was a single bureaucrat or two, both mid-level, in the room. In total, we conducted thirteen interviews with mid-level bureaucrats who worked as experts in the relevant departments of the ministries and other state institutions. The experiences they shared revealed interactions, negotiations, and competitions that took place before policies were finalized. This allowed us to examine inconsistencies within a seemingly working whole. In five additional interviews in state institutions, the department heads were also present. This was not necessarily by design but, by comparing these to the other interviews, we could fortuitously explore power hierarchies and how official discourses may silence ideational conflicts within and between policy institutions.
In what follows, we first review debates about state policies and women's employment in feminist social policy and development studies, focusing on gender mainstreaming and work-family balance. Then, we sketch trends in women's labor force participation in Turkey and discuss policy trajectories emerging from the state's encounters with international institutions and transnational norms regarding gender equality. Following this, we examine the division of labor among relevant state institutions and the design of implemented programs, drawing on interviews and policy documents. We show the particular ways the Turkish state has adopted frameworks of gender mainstreaming and work-family balance in its policy design and practice, reinforcing the peripheralization of, and a familial approach to, the issue of women's labor force participation.
State Policies and Women's Employment
Since the early 1990s, scholars analyzing women's employment policies in advanced capitalist countries have developed an extensive literature on gender and welfare regimes (Orloff 2009 ). At the same time, scholars of gender and development, and international feminist political economy have taken up similar questions for the Global South (Jackson and Pearson 2005; Rai and Waylen 2013) . These two debates connect through studies analyzing how concepts, norms, and ideas travel, are translated, and/or vernacularized in contextually specific ways (Levitt and Merry 2009; Zwingel 2013; Behrends, Park, and Rottenburg 2014) . These studies show that, as concepts such as gender equality, gender mainstreaming, and work-family balance become transnational, local state and non-state actors have stretched, shrunk, and twisted their meanings (Lombardo, Meier, and Verloo 2009) . As a result, the central concepts of gender equality efforts imply different meanings and practices, and wind up working in the service of diverse objectives across the world. This section engages with these debates to emphasize the need to approach states as multi-layered sets of institutions, whose internal hierarchies and ideologies play a predominant role in localizing transnational gender policy discourses, sometimes even to the extent of reversing their meaning while keeping the terminology.
As C¸a glar (2013) states, the debate on gender mainstreaming has two interrelated dimensions: the discursive, where the meaning of the term is determined in a contextually specific manner; and the institutional, where operations of power influence what is problematized, how objectives are defined, and who is involved in policy processes. Several scholars have discussed the conceptual (un)clarity of the term (Daly 2005; Walby 2005) . They have argued that gender mainstreaming is a strategy doomed to failure because it is procedurally overdetermined and substantively underdetermined (Mukhopadhyay 2004; Lombardo and Meier 2006; Meier and Celis 2011) . That is, on the one hand, because implementation depends on existing social policy architectures and political processes (Rubery 2005) , it is hardly effective in contexts with unsupportive policy environments (Hankivsky 2013 ). Limited effectiveness is especially likely when "gender" in gender mainstreaming remains confined to existing narrow understandings of gender roles (True and Parisi 2013) . On the other hand, state actors may devote much energy to restructuring procedures and technicalities while often forgetting the longterm objective of achieving gender equality (Brouwers 2013) . These studies have shown gender mainstreaming's limited potential to reverse the tendency to ghettoize gender as a "specialist" policy field (Daly 2005) . Rather than substantive transformation in mainstream policies, it has only led to changes in the conduct of gender policies (Jacquot 2010) .
Some scholars have therefore problematized gender mainstreaming as a technology that assimilates feminist insights into gendered governance (Brush 2003; Prügl 2011) . Accordingly, the emphasis on organizational practices, procedures, and techniques is not a design failure; rather, it is inherently political and power-laden (Jong 2016) . It transforms state institutions' relations with one another and external feminist advocacy groups; often exhausting the latter's mobilization energies (Mukhopadhyay 2016) . Thus gender mainstreaming aims to change the conduct of bureaucrats by giving them new skills to govern and achieve a broad range of existing governmental objectives, such as poverty reduction, sectoral management, economic growth, and flexibility (Prügl 2011) . For instance, as in the mainstream development paradigm, gender mainstreaming may be associated with "smart economics," which justifies "investing in women" because it can reduce household poverty, improve family well-being (Bedford 2009; Jenson 2009; Bergeron 2011) , or achieve macroeconomic growth (Chant and Sweetman 2012; Razavi 2012) . Alternatively, it can be defined in a way to support existing hegemonic ideologies around women, "national essence," or "cultural imperialism" (Schech and Mustafa 2010; Shash and Forden 2016) . Such critiques inspire the question of whether and how gender mainstreaming makes it hard to politicize gender inequality on feminist terms (Fraser 2009) .
These arguments become all the more relevant when we turn our attention to the concept of work-family reconciliation, which originally stemmed from efforts to promote gender equality in the labor market and gradually was infused with other objectives such as advancing labor market flexibility, promoting economic growth, responding to demographic decline, and investing in future generations (Stratigaki 2004; Lombardo, Meier, and Verloo 2009; Mahon 2009 ). Empirical studies focusing on rich capitalist countries show that family policies oriented to increasing maternal employment have significantly expanded, but countries continue to vary in terms of generosity, policy instruments, and the degree of defamilialization of care (Lewis et al. 2008; Daly 2011; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2015) . Given this variation, researchers warn that gender inequalities in income, job opportunities, and leisure persist. They document a complicated landscape, where "traditional" notions of family (and its gendered divisions of labor) as the appropriate place of care continue to be endorsed alongside a vision of "modernized" families, in which mothers are employed and care is provided through public support (Daly 2011; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2015) .
This approach, at the center of new labor market and family policies in rich capitalist countries (M€ atzke and Ostner 2010), has also traveled to the Global South (Razavi 2013) . Writing on this process, Razavi (2013) warns that both meanings and effects are transformed when these care policies travel to entirely different socioeconomic and political landscapes. Empirical studies draw attention to three interrelated phenomena. First, state institutions in contact with transnational development agencies and NGOs promote a variety of childcare programs, but often with little concern for service quality (Mahon 2009 ). The resulting patchwork of public, private, and community provision consolidates a segmented market (Razavi 2013 ) that reproduces class inequalities, despite the policies' aim of disrupting intergenerational poverty transfer (Faur 2011; Palriwala and Neetha 2011) . Second, this instrumental approach is occasionally packaged as part of efforts to promote women's employment as care workers, achieve gender equality, and support women's access to decent work (Staab and Gerhard 2011; Lopreite and Macdonald 2014) . Finally, as in the European context, policy implementation varies across countries. In Latin America, for example, Blofield and Franzoni (2014) show how states adopt diverse combinations of policy instruments that endorse various degrees of maternalism, co-responsibility, and defamilialization. As Staab (2012) argues, these variations reflect significant role historical legacies, existing policy environments, and state institutions, play on the design and implementation of social policies regarding care work.
These studies reveal the countless ways in which policies that prioritize demographic and market objectives, promote family and private provisioning of care, naturalize the mother-child tie, and pay little or no attention to altering hegemonic cultural norms can marginalize questions of gender inequality (Stratigaki 2004; Staab 2012; Razavi 2013; Jenson 2015) . Our case study contributes to this literature by focusing on divisions of labor within and between different state institutions and on policy implementation in response to the problem of women's low labor force participation in Turkey. We show how discourses of gender mainstreaming and work-family balance morph as they travel across borders, sometimes becoming unrecognizable in the process. First, we conceptualize the state as a hierarchical and multi-layered set of institutions within which policy actors with different power configurations and ideological convictions compete in vernacularizing transnational policy discourses. We follow the traveling and translation of transnational gender policy norms in state institutions. Focusing on mid-level actors in various institutional positions with their particular histories, logic, and priorities, we explore processes of contestation and negotiation in divisions of labor as well as policy design. Second, we trace the production of unexpected kinds of gender politics, which ultimately contradict even limited definitions of gender mainstreaming and work-family balance. We argue that the Turkish case introduces the possibility that institutionalization patterns and policies designed specifically to achieve gender equality can end up doing exactly the opposite when filtered through existing ideological convictions and policy priorities. Ours is a case where state-level interactions result in a vernacularization in which, arguably, even the core of the norm is no longer present (Levitt and Merry 2009 ).
Emergence of Women's Employment as a Policy Issue in Turkey
Historically, women's participation in Turkey's labor force has always been lower than global trends. While 34 percent of working-age women were in the labor force in 1988, this declined to 23 percent during the following decade before returning to 32.5 percent in 2016 when women's employment rate was 28 percent (TURKSTAT 2017). These figures are significantly below global averages of 49.5 percent and 46.4 percent, respectively (ILO 2017) . Furthermore, despite the recent increase, Turkey's figures still lag behind comparable countries such as Mexico, Italy, Greece, and Spain, with whom it shares characteristics such as the male-bread-winner model, low female employment, and generally high unemployment (Karamessini 2008) . This raises the question of why Turkey is exceptional even among "peer" nations.
Various scholars argue that the shift from agricultural to urban industries and the resulting rural-urban migration have had a gendered impact on Turkey's employment structure. Accordingly, export-led growth in urban areas has been unable to generate suitable employment to absorb the rural labor supply of women released from agriculture (C¸agatay and Berik 1990; Başlevent and Onaran 2004; Bu gra and Yakut-C¸akar 2010) . Even though women with higher education have been able to access jobs in Turkey's growing non-manual sector since the 1980s (Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smits 2008; _ Ilkkaracan 2012), for the vast majority of women who lacked necessary education and marketable skills, the path to employment remained closed (Gürsel and Tunalı 2007) .
Others have explored the role that widespread social norms governing women's "proper" behavior and place in society play in hindering women's work outside the household (Göksel 2013; Dildar 2015) ; particularly how such norms constrain the jobs and positions women can seek (Dedeo glu 2010) and influence the negotiations they must conduct with families and communities to do so (Beşpınar 2010) . These value systems also help explain the persistence of regulations that assume a patriarchal family structure or fail to challenge it sufficiently (Korkut and Eslen-Ziya 2011; Dedeo glu 2012) . Requiring husbands' consent for women's paid employment became unconstitutional in 1990. However, the gendered division of labor in the household, long working hours, low pay in occupations open to women, lack of paid parental leave, and the legal requirement to offer childcare facilities only in workplaces employing more than 150 women continue to constrain women's options in the labor market (Dayıo glu and Kırdar 2010; _ Ilkkaracan 2012). There is also evidence that employer decisions and practices regarding hiring, wage determination, promotion, and termination continue to discriminate against women with impunity ( Toksöz and Kardam 2004; KE _ IG 2013 ). This makes paid employment unattractive for the majority of women so they exit the market when they can ( _ Ilkkaracan 2012; Bu gra 2014). Although the current labor market situation is negative, Turkish policy discussions on gender equality and promotion of women's employment have been quite vibrant since the 1990s. Pressures from international institutions such as the EU, the UN, and the WB, and local feminist demands have impacted policy discussions in various ways. In this sense, the history of international policy transfer since the 1990s can be seen as a patchwork of goals of gender mainstreaming, women's empowerment, and pro-poor economic growth. Even though these transnational norms were introduced into the national context because of multiple nodes of pressure, different policy actors' varying priorities and ideologies have been pivotal in how they were translated and implemented.
One of the milestones of transnational feminist advocacy relevant to the Turkish context is the UN Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which Turkey ratified with reservations in 1985. This ratification in and of itself was a response to international pressure, and did not necessarily imply intention for implementation (Berik 1990; Kardam 2005) . Nevertheless, a Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women was established as a nation-state-level "women's machinery" in 1990, which can be seen as a response to international discourses on gender equality (Kardam 2005) . Even though women's employment remained secondary in the agenda of local feminist groups, the Women's Directorate provided an institutionalized framework to influence the state through "sustained pressure" (Aldıkac¸tı-Marshall 2013). As a result of feminist advocacy groups' successful use of Turkey's EU accession process to anchor demands for legal reforms, Turkey's reservations to CEDAW were removed in 1999, and new civil and penal codes were introduced in the early 2000s (Kandiyoti 2010; Dedeo glu 2012) . However, during this period, the directorate itself remained understaffed and underfunded for more than a decade until it was given permanent status under the Prime Ministry in 2004 (Kardam 2005) before coming under the newly established Ministry of Family and Social Policies in 2011. This latter move strained its relations with feminist groups, who saw it as institutionalizing a familial understanding of women's problems (Alnıac¸ık and € Ustübici 2012) . Overall, these complex shifts reveal the multiplicity of actors involved in translating transnational gender norms to Turkey (Kardam 2011) .
The specific goal of increasing Turkish women's labor force participation first appeared in the 1990s, in the 6th Development Plan (Toksöz 2012 ). This reflected international institutions' support for the norm of gender equality in the labor market, and local expectations that demand for women's labor would increase following Turkey's neoliberal transition. In the 1990s, the UNDP and the WB funded Turkey's first two projects aiming to increase women's labor force participation (Toksöz 2012) while the Women's Directorate began funding women's income-generating activities through a semi-public bank, HalkBank (Berik 1990 ). These projects, however modest, exemplified the gradual translation of transnational gender policy norms to the local context. After 1999, when Turkey was accepted as a candidate for full EU membership, increased EU funding resulted in a proliferation of public and private projects, all intended to increase women's labor force participation. Consequently, new human resources units were introduced under the Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Development to manage these funds.
The latest development was the 2010 Prime Ministry memorandum, entitled "Increasing Female Employment and Ensuring Equal Opportunities," announcing the establishment of a national monitoring and coordination board headed by the undersecretary of the Ministry of Labor, comprising high-level bureaucrats, representatives from trade unions, NGOs, and academics. However, this board proved ineffective, with one of our interviewees describing it as a strategic move on paper, intended to positively influence the EU Commission's 2010 progress report for Turkey. Like other participants on the board, she did not expect the memorandum to have a real effect because it lacked powers to sanction.
Although no major legislative changes potentially affecting women's labor force participation have happened since 2010, there have been less publicized changes in internal divisions of labor, which reveal the complex ways in which transnational gender norms are translated, as discussed below. Overall, transnational gender policy norms such as gender mainstreaming, work-family balance, and empowerment have become popularized in the Turkish policy environment. As one bureaucrat put it, these are increasingly conceived as "general truths" around which policies are framed, albeit often merely strategically.
The Policy Architecture and Reflections on Gender Mainstreaming
This section details the complex policy architecture established in Turkey in the last three decades, an outcome of encounters between state institutions, women's movements, and transnational discourses and imperatives. These encounters are also informed by diverging ideological stances on gender equality and the broader consolidation of neoliberalism in Turkey. In this policy environment, on the one hand, one witnesses expressions responding to the "general truth" as state actors are inclined to use the relevant idioms in their official declarations. On the other hand, there is an equally prominent, parallel discourse of developing a "policy model appropriate for Turkish society." Through this move from "general truths" to what is "appropriate for Turkish society" we trace the translation of transnational gender policy norms, and the culturalization and politicization of seemingly technical policy models. Whereas, on paper, gender mainstreaming espouses the decentralization of gender and its infusion into all policy making areas and institutions (Daly 2005; Jacquot 2010 ), the translation process results in a division of labor and responsibilities among state institutions, which marginalizes the issue of women's labor force participation.
Our interviewees, who occupied positions in different institutions, voiced diverse and often contradictory views regarding women's employment. Some approached the problem as a matter of social inclusion; others saw it as an obstacle to economic development, while some still saw such policies as "redundant" or "dangerous" because they threatened "Turkish culture." Others worried that increasing women's participation in the labor force could "be costly" for the government because it could jeopardize the objective of sustaining population growth. Yet others distanced themselves from high-level decision-makers, hesitating to speak for their institutions. One defined the institutional view as follows: "Strong women build strong families, and strong families ensure a strong society," which was reminiscent of the official view, often reiterated by high-level political actors (AK Party 2009). In fact, several high-level political actors are known to insist that all women need to give birth to at least three children, for this vision of a "strong" Turkey. This interviewee, however, clarified her viewpoint as follows: "My primary preference is to empower women. Then what women do, whether they choose to raise and empower their families is something else. It's their choice."
The one commonality between the narratives of mid-level bureaucrats was their tendency to distance themselves from the official position of their institutions especially if their viewpoints differed. These mid-level bureaucrats, officially responsible for designing policy, claimed a limited role despite their expertise in the transnational lexicon. For instance, one bureaucrat commented that in policy meetings aiming to incorporate the transnational policy language, they encountered high-level decision-makers who invoked women's "traditional" roles such as mothering and the home as a woman's place. Another lamented that "for many, the mind-set has not changed," describing how arguments were often voiced along the lines of: "We already have a problem of unemployment. Why bother trying to encourage women to look for jobs?" One interviewee declared: "[T]he state will decide which policy will be implemented." We asked her who the state was, and she responded: "It is the government." These individual and institutional perceptions revealed a terrain where actors officially responsible for the policy architecture felt they lacked authority. There were multiple opinions voiced, but we found that some, more in line with the government perspective, ranked higher than others in determining outcomes, as evidenced in interviews where department heads were present.
Although several state institutions seemed to participate in promoting women's labor force participation according to gender mainstreaming recommendations, our interviews showed that the roles claimed by the core institutions of this policy architecture sidelined the objective of promoting women's employment if it clashed with other objectives. Among these institutions, the most visible is the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. One bureaucrat quipped that everyone, from NGOs to private citizens, was likely to call this ministry's hotline for anything that had to do with women. This public visibility appears to confirm the original international vision of having a specialized institution in gender matters, which predates the gender mainstreaming agenda (Kardam 2005) . However, several interviewees saw the responsibility of this institution as limited to "defining the problem" and ensuring its public visibility. Mid-level bureaucrats saw their roles as reflecting a "women's perspective" in policy talks, signing protocols with other ministries, and occasionally implementing temporary projects. This role attribution excluded authority within the relevant legal framework, which falls under the purview of the Ministry of Labor, and situated the Ministry of Family and Social Policies at the bottom of the hierarchical division of labor.
An added complexity was that, after the Women's Directorate became part of the Ministry of Family, substantial energy was devoted to social inclusion. Consequently, when the experts talked about women's labor, the language frequently slipped into helping women "in need." One, for instance, told us that there was a major difference between what they meant when they talked about women's entrepreneurship and what other public institutions, such as the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Organization, meant: "They have in mind someone with capital." While the Women's Directorate's interest in poor women's social inclusion is not problematic per se, we observed that conflating poverty and gender concerns not only dampened its ability to influence core labor market policies but also created a situation in which gender policies were instrumentalized for reducing household poverty.
Apart from the problem of a limited and instrumental activity domain, exercising power was difficult even in this restricted area. The bureaucrats who were involved in bringing the previously independent Directorate under the Ministry of Family told us that this transition strengthened them because now they had a larger staff and budget, and were authorized to implement policy. However, this did not obviate an inevitable contradiction between women's empowerment as individuals versus approaching women's rights under the rubric of family policies. One Ministry of Labor expert was outspoken about restricting the Directorate's role to matters of family. He asked, "Why don't they work on issues such as domestic violence and the like? Labor market is our turf." This particular division of labor reflects the persistence of "welfare state bifurcation" into a masculine labor market system and a feminine family/household system (Fraser 1987) .
All of our interviewees in the Ministry of Labor emphasized that women's labor force participation was their jurisdiction. True to form, international institutions also saw the Ministry as the focal point for policy negotiation and funding allocation regarding employment programs. Reflecting this recognition, the 2010 Prime Ministerial memorandum on women's employment and equal opportunities gave the Ministry of Labor's undersecretary the role of heading the coordination board. As explained before, the memorandum was an official response to transnational norms, yet it had no real effect. When this came up in the interviews, interviewees initially claimed that women's labor force participation constituted just one issue among many, although they ultimately acknowledged that it was simply not a priority. Speaking of the memorandum's lack of impact, one remarked: "Do you know how many memorandums get issued per day?"
The official positioning of the Ministry of Labor as an arbitrator between employees and employers further complicated its engagement with increasing women's employment since its approach often favored employers' demands. Interviewees noted frequently that the Ministry ought to consider "the employer perspective" so employers should not be burdened with the cost of reforms enabling women to participate in the labor market. By sheer dint of repetition, "the employer perspective" emerged as the governing approach in all matters. Thus, although the Ministry of Labor seemed to consider women's labor force participation as a general labor problem to deal with, it marginalized this policy issue among its other self-designated responsibilities.
Interviewees in the Ministry of Development, the third influential institution of this policy architecture, repeated the themes of cost and prioritization calculations even more strongly. Underlining their responsibility for preparing the state's capital budget, experts argued that the Ministry had to "balance" the government's social functions with budgetary objectives. They noted how this responsibility positioned this Ministry above others, affirming the hierarchical division of labor. For experts here, women's employment was a costprone problem. One told us that Turkey's low positioning in gender indices was a "nuisance" to which they had to respond, but ultimately budget constraints and other development objectives took priority. Furthermore, because of the consensus that employers should not incur costs, they described the Ministry's aim as finding "the most efficient and least costly" solution for the government.
This Ministry also prioritized the government's publicly endorsed objective of sustaining population growth. In fact, some experts saw women's employment as a major cause of declining birth rates. This perception mirrored the 2013 Development Plan, which identified the fertility rate among working women as a performance index for the "Program for the Protection of the Family and the Dynamic Population Structure." This development plan conceptualizes work-family balance as an initiative helping the state achieve population growth, rather than promoting women's employment or gender equality. As several interviewees put it, because women working outside the home may mean fewer children per household, policies had to be designed to preempt this "danger." This interpretation of work-family balance is not really about reducing the earning/caring contradiction, nor even instrumentalizing family policies to increase women's wage labor as some critics of European social policies note (M€ atzke and Ostner 2010; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2015) . Instead, Turkey's policy of work-family life reconciliation is instrumentalized to reinforce the institution of the family.
These findings show how gender mainstreaming has been introduced into the Turkish context, with multiple state institutions addressing women's low labor force participation, at least superficially. However, a closer look reveals a different picture: there are clear hierarchies among the institutions and actors involved, with those at the top often marginalizing women's labor force participation issues, or redefining them in such a way to service other policy goals. The emerging institutional division of responsibilities strengthens the androcentric organization of the labor market by allowing the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Development to retain their dominant positions over the women's machinery in determining employment policies. Furthermore, by prioritizing other policy goals, such as reducing budgetary costs, securing employers' profits, sustaining population growth, and reducing household poverty, this policy architecture defines work-family balance in a way that deepens the familialization and informalization of women's labor. We turn now to these policies, programs of women's labor force participation and their design.
Program Design and Reflections on Work-Family Balance
In this section, we evaluate the design of programs implemented, taking into consideration first their structures; that is, their time span, funding sources, and positioning in relevant institutions. We then explore their content. Specifically focusing on activities in three realms, training, credit disbursal, and care, we find that the programs end up reproducing existing gender inequalities in both the household and the labor market, locking women into the informal sector and areas of activity with few market expansion possibilities. This occurs because the programs usually remain tangential to the permanent activities of ministries. Moreover instead of addressing issues of unequal sharing of household labor, they take it for granted. Once again, this structural marginalization occurs in tandem with the seeming incorporation of gender mainstreaming and work-family balance.
If one impact of EU relations has been the transfer of transnational gender policy norms, another has been a substantive increase in project funding. Interviewees often repeated with discomfort their reliance on EU project funding for their programs. This created a perverse incentive where EU funding replaced the state budget and relevant policy implementation often remained as one-shot initiative. For instance, one EU-funded project targeted institutional capacity development inside the Ministry of Labor by training personnel for policy development ensuring gender equality in working life. A new department was established for this purpose but, once the funding ran out, it became a ghost town.
Although many institutions appeared to comply with the gender mainstreaming agenda through projects targeting women's labor force participation, these projects actually depended on temporary funding. As a result, we witnessed a piece-meal, haphazard, and reactive policy terrain in which gender mainstreaming did not necessarily become permanently institutionalized. This was also bolstered by the lack and fragmented nature of available data on budgets, target group specifications, beneficiary characteristics, and program outcomes. The absence of baseline data and the limited availability of outcome figures precluded any impact analysis. Overall, reliance on international funding for projects created a bizarre situation where project goals were marginalized by the very fact that they were projects rather than a fundamental reorganization of ministry budgets, power, or priorities.
One interviewee described the problem as beyond "project fetishism." She began by remarking how their encounters with the EU had allowed them to learn the logic behind doing projects. She described this logic as coming up with new approaches to existing problems, testing them during implementation, tweaking them according to impact, and finally making them part of permanent state policy. However, she told us that current project writing in Turkey meant basically repackaging what state departments were already doing under the name of projects. One expert in the Turkish Employment Agency seemed to confirm this observation, describing how state institutions and NGOs seeking EU development funding were inundating their office with project proposals repeating what the agency was already doing. Thus, in addition to temporariness, these projects did not even meet the project ideal of developing new solutions.
The temporary design also affected program content because most projects clustered around training and one-time credit and/or grant disbursal. This was partly due to the gendered institutional division of labor, which prevents long-term and collaborative planning, but it also had to do with limited temporal horizons of projects: that is, for both training programs and money transfer activities, it was easier to define a beginning and end point. Most projects centered on vocational training, led by the Turkish Employment Agency as the designated job training facilitator. Statistics for trainee numbers presented a seemingly positive picture, with women and men participating in roughly equal numbers. However, the limited data available also showed that women lagged far behind men in making the transition to the labor market. When we mentioned this discrepancy during our interviews at the agency, the first reaction was that women did not want to work. However, when we probed the limited data drawing the interviewees' attention to the visible horizontal segregation during training, interviewees responded that sewing, childcare, and catering were "what women wanted." In short, program content and implementation, and their justification by state actors repeated assumed gendered roles even as they were presented as efforts to increase gender equality in the labor market.
We also asked interviewees to explain the continued equal participation of women although they did not find jobs afterward. They suggested that the courses gave women a legitimate reason for appearing in public. In fact, several said that this was itself, a "success" and that the actual goal of labor force participation was less important in the case of women. Another explanation drew on the discourse of social inclusion because participants receive a token daily stipend for participating in the training courses. Although one expert found this disappointing because it was irrelevant to the training programs' primary goal, others praised it for supporting poor women financially. Thus, the institutional conflation of gender and poverty concerns discussed above continued at the program level. Undoubtedly, women's public presence and social inclusion should not be ignored as important policy outcomes. Yet, only focusing on these observations as successes disguised the failure to achieve tangible results in these programs' ostensible goal of increasing women's labor force participation.
It was not only that most programs did not address women's low labor force participation for its own sake. On the rare occasions when women's work was the focus, programs often sidelined issues of decent and secure employment, as evidenced by another core activity: credit and grant disbursal. Again in contrast to permanent programs for the general population, initiatives specifically targeting women were temporary projects using international funding, with their content reflecting two caveats additional to those discussed above. First, their targets and eligibility criteria reinforced institutional prioritization regarding social inclusion. The projects, which began with the goal of increasing women's access to the labor market, ended up providing temporary relief for poor households through credit, which the bureaucrats often said was not expected to be paid back. Once again, this is not a problem about the existence of social inclusion programs. Rather, our concern is that this set up approaches women instrumentally, as targets of ad hoc poverty relief. This strategy not only fails to challenge inequitable gender norms but reinforces them by identifying women as familial subjects (Kabeer 1997; Molyneux 2006; Chant 2008) .
Second, the programs prioritized grant projects that either trained women in the care sector or encouraged local food production and traditional handicrafts. The most striking example was the Ministry of Labor's 24-million-euro, EU-funded Promotion of Women's Employment Operation Grant Scheme. Officially, it aimed to fund local state institutions' and NGOs' projects to increase women's employability, support women's entrepreneurship, and eliminate cultural barriers to their labor force participation. The projects had to target women in poor regions, outside the labor force due to either household care responsibilities or rural-urban migration. The initial, medium-term goal was for 35 percent of beneficiaries to gain employment and 30 percent to become entrepreneurs. 2 In the end, only 914 (9 percent) of the women trained gained employment. Without any follow-up mechanism, there was no information on how long the jobs or the enterprises lasted. Furthermore, of the 178 training projects, 113 targeted care-giving, traditional handicrafts, food production, or agricultural activities-traditional areas for women's employment.
3 This concentration reproduced current gendered divisions of labor, occupational sex segregation, and women's limited labor market access. Routinely restricting women to producing niche local food and souvenirs for a precarious and sometimes disappearing market not only represented an instrumental approach to women's work, but, additionally, it ignored market cues when it came to women's labor force and directed them into precarious, informal, and burdensome jobs likely to fail. As general statistics confirm, 90 percent of self-employed women in Turkey work in the informal sector while their earnings place them in the lowest income group within the labor market, just above unpaid family workers in agriculture (Ercan 2011) .
Beyond this problem, self-employment functions as a social safety net without challenging existing gender norms or gendered divisions of labor (Kılıc2 008; Bu gra and Yakut-C¸akar 2010; Altan-Olcay 2014). The abundance of grants for projects in areas traditionally considered women's activities or home-based work supports observations that the goal of gender equality has lost importance (Jenson 2015) . The programs' contents appeared rather to target women's ability to earn supplementary income, preferably from homebased, self-employed, or informal work, thereby strengthening "gendered familialism" (Palriwala and Neetha 2011) . Thus the programs contributed to ascribing particular meanings to gender, defining men and women's supposedly appropriate attributes and responsibilities. In all programs, the question was not about rethinking the work-family nexus so as to redistribute and socialize care work more equitably. Instead, women are still assumed to be secondary breadwinners, primary caregivers, and instruments of poverty alleviation, without much consideration of the pressures and time poverty that this may cause for them. This is all the more relevant when we look at what is (or rather, is not) done in terms of care policies. Both interviewees and policy documents were silent regarding feminist demands for paternity leave. In the interviews, bureaucrats repeated several reservations about public provisioning of childcare. Current labor law requires companies employing more than 150 women to facilitate childcare services, either in the workplace or through monetary assistance. However, demands to lower this threshold or amend it to "150 employees" were rejected because it would "intimidate employers." Interviewees considered other alternatives, such as subsidizing the private sector or direct state provisioning, as too costly for the government. Some interviewees recalled debates in which the Ministry of Development experts disputed any connection between the absence of affordable collective childcare services and women's low labor force participation rate because the official labor force surveys did not report women's complaints about this. 4 Several interviewees claimed that women would rather take care of their children themselves or get help from female relatives. While the Ministry of Family experts believed this reflected women's lack of trust in the quality of the existing services, others believed it proved women's preference for care labor. Overall, the three ministries apparently agreed only on providing flexible, part-time employment opportunities for women until children start mandatory primary education. This work-family reconciliation policy, applicable only for women in public employment, was institutionalized in January 2016. This policy outcome once again reveals that the state avoids responding to the shortfall of institutional care services. In this context, resembling southern European countries with underdeveloped welfare states, the demand for care services created by professional women and weakening family ties is partly filled with migrant care workers (Toksöz and € Unlütürk Ulutaş 2012). In the three years since our interviews, two additional projects addressing this issue have begun: a 47-million-euro project 5 that provides funding (320 euros/month) to 10,000 mothers to hire private caregivers; and a 1.6-million-euro "Grandmother Project," 6 which gives approximately 110 euros/ month to 6,000 grandmothers to care for their grandchildren. Whereas the EU provides 85 percent of the first project subsidizing market care, the Turkish Employment Agency and several national institutions fund the "Grandmother Project." While the first project promotes formalization and marketization of care, the second rewards a familial solution to care labor, promoting the image of the "nurturing three generational extended family" (Yazıcı 2012 ). Similar to projects implemented in other developing contexts (Staab and Gerhard 2011; Lopreite and Macdonald 2014) , the first is packaged as a "win-win" solution, enabling employed women to reconcile their paid work with domestic care responsibilities and aiming to create new employment opportunities for women out of the labor force. The second does not aim to create new employment; the central objective is "strengthening traditional family ties."
Here, however, we particularly want to underline the projects' similarities, as well. Both are temporary, and assume that care is women's responsibility that should be provided on an individual basis at home. Thus, neither envisions changing the gendered division of care labor: the project descriptions do not involve men, even as fathers. Neither sees public provision of childcare as a "social right," in contrast to the demands of feminist organizations (KE _ IG 2013). In addition to familialization and privatization, these projects, with their limited terrain, do not address sufficiently informal care labor undertaken by migrant women for families who can afford it. Taken together, these projects also follow similar patterns in other developing contexts, revealing a fragmented care policy terrain and with little concern for quality of services and for the reproduction of class and gender inequalities (Faur 2011; Palriwala and Neetha 2011; Razavi 2013) .
As a result, while Turkey readily adopts the goal of work-family balance, it is emptied of gender equality content and utilized more to achieve population growth and protect a particular ideological understanding of family. This means that state institutions end up paying only lip-service to transnational "general truths" about work-family balance and women's labor force participation. Actual implementation falls short of the already limited visions of work-family balance and have little impact on women's labor force participation. In addition, the programs also reproduce gendered familialism in accordance with the government's hegemonic discourses (Schech and Mustafa 2010; Shash and Forden 2016) .
Concluding Remarks
This paper explored the distance between Turkish state institutions' apparent willingness to abide by transnational gender policy discourses and the implementation of very different gender politics. We have conceptualized the state as a multi-layered set of institutions, whose internal hierarchies, conflicts, and practices can best be traced through the experience of state actors within them in conjunction with written material such as laws, policy directives, and memoranda. This tracing reveals a complex policy architecture around the issue of women's labor force participation in Turkey. In this policy architecture, there is a chasm between the official rhetoric adopted from transnational norms and the actual gendered familialism. First, despite the agenda of gender mainstreaming, institutions and actors who are intent on problematizing women's low labor force participation are marginalized. Second, relevant programs are peripheralized through their positioning in the policy architecture, their subordination to other, supposedly more important goals, their limited time-spans and dependence on project funding. These projects ultimately consolidate precisely the problems highlighted by feminist writing: they repeatedly pour money into programs that reproduce women's marginalized positions in the labor market and consolidate the assumption that care work is women's responsibility and should be home-based.
What does this all mean? Our research reveals multiple state institutions, and abundant discussions and activities centered on women and employment as policy problems. Although this might indicate that there is gender mainstreaming, with decentralization of gender questions across policy departments, this is only superficial. Neither the multiple state institutions nor the flurry of activities actually change Turkey's existing welfare state structure, which still assumes and reinforces conservative gender norms and gendered divisions of labor. Speaking to debates in the literature on gender mainstreaming as a governmental technology, we find that adopting gender mainstreaming changes state actors' conduct as they can now talk the gender talk, access international funding, and use it to achieve different objectives while at the same time insisting on the perception that women's employment is a costprone problem and detrimental to the familial image of Turkish society. Thus, in Turkey, gender mainstreaming and the institutional division of labor it endorses has not changed prevailing gender norms. Nor has it promoted an environment where more women can access secure and decent work outside of home.
The role of work-family balance in these discourses also supports this conclusion. In this case, the concept is more likely to be deployed to enact policies that reinforce the institution of the family and its gender division of care labor, rather than increase women's access to decent employment outside the household. Literature shows that gender policy norms on women's labor force participation have gone transnational. Empirical studies also show that as norms travel across borders, they are translated and vernacularized in locally specific ways, a process which produces diverse meanings and implementations, and not necessarily on feminist terms. As state actors translate and reinterpret transnational gender policy bullet points, they bend them to fit their ideological dispositions and governmental objectives. Our case study of Turkey contributes to this literature by showing how this work produces not only un-feminist conceptualizations but also a paradigmatic setting that assumes and naturalizes gender inequality. Thus, the problem is greater than the limits inherent in vague and procedure-oriented conceptualizations of gender mainstreaming and work-family balance discourses and policies. Rather, this case shows how locally specific translations and vernacularizations by state actors can completely reverse these concepts' original meanings.
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